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Abstract
A novel strategy to encrypt covert information (code) via unitary projections into
the null spaces of ill-conditioned eigenstructures of multiple host statistical distribu-
tions, inferred from incomplete constraints, is presented. The host pdf ’s are inferred
using the maximum entropy principle. The projection of the covert information is
dependent upon the pdf ’s of the host statistical distributions. The security of the
encryption/decryption strategy is based on the extreme instability of the encoding
process. A self-consistent procedure to derive keys for both symmetric and asym-
metric cryptography is presented. The advantages of using a multiple pdf model to
achieve encryption of covert information are briefly highlighted. Numerical simula-
tions exemplify the efficacy of the model.
Key words: Statistical encryption/decryption, projections, ill-conditioned
eigenstructures, inference, maximum entropy.
PACS: 05.20.-y, 02.50.Tt, 02.30.Zz, 07.05.Kf, 89.70.+c
1 Introduction
The success of prominent contemporary cryptosystems is attributed to the de-
gree of difficulty in computing integer factorizations [1] and discrete logarithms
[2, 3], respectively. This paper describes a novel strategy to encode covert in-
formation via unitary projections into the null spaces of the eigenstructures of
a hierarchy of host statistical distributions (multiple pdf ’s). The multiple pdf ’s
are inferred from an incomplete set of constraints (physical observable’s) using
the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) principle [4]. Here, a multiple pdf model is
defined as a hierarchial ensemble of pdf ’s pν ; ν = 1, .... The index ν is defined
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as the hierarchy index. This paper defines the host pdf ’s pν to deviate from
the equilibrium state, with increasing values of ν.
The case of incomplete constraints corresponds to scenarios where the num-
ber of constraints (physical observable’s) is less than the dimension of the
distribution. In a discrete setting, the MaxEnt Lagrangian for a single host
pdf pν(xn) = p
ν
n;n = 1, ..., N is [4]:
LME = −
N∑
n=1
pνn lnp
ν
n +
M∑
i=0
N∑
n=1
λνi p
ν
nΘi (xn), (1)
M < N , where the Lagrange multiplier (LM) λνo corresponds to the pdf
normalization condition
N∑
n=1
pνn = 1 . The LM’s λ
ν
i ; i = 1, ...,M correspond
to physical constraints of the form
N∑
n=1
pνnΘi (xn) = d
ν
i ; i = 1, ...,M . Here,
Θi (xn) ; i = 1, ...,M is an operator, and, d
ν
i ; i = 1, ...,M are the incomplete
constraints. This paper employs geometric moment constraints, i.e. Θi (xn) =
xin; i = 1, ...,M . Solution of (1) yields:
pνn = exp
[
− M∑
i=0
λνi x
i
n
]
;n = 1, ..., N,
and,
eλ
ν
o =
N∑
n=1
e−λ
ν
i
xin ; i = 1, ...,M.
(2)
Solution of (2) for a given input set of LM’s, is referred to as the forward
MaxEnt problem. Inference of pdf ’s and the concomitant LM’s, given an input
set of dνi ; i = 1, ...,M , is referred to as the inverse MaxEnt problem.
Statistical distributions inferred from incomplete constraints possess eigen-
structures that are ill-conditioned. These demonstrate extreme sensitivity to
perturbations. This sensitivity is exploited to formulate a principled framework
to encrypt/decrypt code 1 . The null spaces of these eigenstructures constitute
an “invisible reservoir” into which covert information may be projected. The
projection is achieved without altering the host statistical distributions. The
advantage of statistical encryption is that the dimension of the code that can
be encrypted increases with the size of the statistical distribution. The projec-
tion of code into a host statistical distribution is also a promising candidate
to implement steganography [5], and, related disciplines in information hiding
[6].
1 In this paper, the terms code and covert information are used interchangeably.
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A recent study has treated the statistical encryption/decryption of covert
information, using the Fisher information as the measure of uncertainty [7].
Qualitative distinctions vis-a´-vis an equivalent MaxEnt formulation [8] have
been established. The encoding strategies in [7] and [8] are independent of
the pdf of the host statistical distribution. Encoding covert information into
multiple pdf ’s allows code of dimension greater than that of any single host
pdf to be selectively encrypted into the multiple pdf ’s. An example of this
is the encryption of multi-dimensional code defined in matrix form, such as
image data. In this case, each dimension of the code (column/row vector of the
matrix) may be selectively encoded into individual components (single host
pdf ’s) of a multiple host pdf model. Each single host pdf is taken to be one
dimensional in the continuum.
Conversely, the dimension of each host in a multiple pdf model may be chosen
by the designer to be less than the dimension of the code. This is tantamount
to effecting a tradeoff between the dimension of a single host pdf, and, the
number of hosts comprising a multiple pdf model. The success of employing
multiple pdf’s to enhance the security of the covert information, is critically
contingent upon the encryption/decryption strategy being dependent upon the
pdf’s of the statistical hosts. This feature permits the pdf dependent statistical
encryption/decryption strategy to possess immense qualitative flexibility, as
compared with pdf independent models [7, 8]. Numerical simulations demon-
strate impressive quantitative performance in securing covert information.
2 Projection of the Covert Information
Consider M constraints dν1, ..., d
ν
M . In a discrete setting, these are expectation
values of a random variable xi,n;n = 1, ..., N :
dνi =
N∑
n=1
pνnxi,n; i = 1, ...,M. (3)
Evoking the Dirac bra-ket notation [9], the pdf |pν〉 ∈ ℜN which is a col-
umn vector (ket), where |n〉 ;n = 1, ..., N is the standard basis in ℜN , is
expressed as |pν〉 = N∑
n=1
|n〉 〈n | pν〉 = N∑
n=1
pνn |n〉 . Defining the column vector
of observable’s as |dν〉 ∈ ℜM+1 with components dν1, ..., dνM , 1 , and, an op-
erator A : ℜN → ℜM+1 given by A = N∑
n=1
|xn〉 〈n| . Defining vectors |xn〉 ∈
ℜM+1;n = 1, ..., N as the expansion |xn〉 =
M+1∑
i=1
|i〉 〈i | xn〉 =
M+1∑
i=1
xi,n |i〉 ,
3
where i is a basis vector in ℜM+1, (3) may be expressed simply as:
|dν〉 = A |pν〉 ;A : ℜN → ℜM+1. (4)
The physical significance of the constraint operator A in (4) is as follows.
Inference of the pdf from physical observable’s employing (2) is achieved by
specifying Θi (xn) = x
i
n . Setting, x
i
n → xi,n; i = 1, ...,M ;n = 1, ..., N , the
xi,n constitute the elements of the M rows and N columns of the operator
Aν . The unity element in |dν〉 ∈ ℜM+1 enforces the normalization of |pν〉.
Consequently, xM+1,n = x
M+1
n = 1;n = 1, ..., N .
The operator A is independent of the host pdf. This qualitative deficiency
may be rectified by defining:
A˜ν = A+ kν |dν〉 〈I| . (5)
Here, 〈I| is a 1×N row vector (bra), and, kν 6= −1 is a constant parameter
introduced to adjust the condition number of A˜ν , and hence its sensitivity
to perturbations. In (5), dependence upon the host pdf is ”injected” into the
operator A˜ν by the incorporation of |dν〉 . Specifically, each element of the
ket |dν〉 is defined by dνi =
N∑
n=1
pνnx
i
n; i = 1, ...,M .
Re-defining (4) in terms of (5) yields: A˜ν |pν〉 = |dν〉 + 〈kν |dν〉 〈I|〉
ν
, where
〈•〉ν signifies the expectation evaluated at the hierarchy index ν . Expanding
〈kν |dν〉 〈I|〉ν = kν |dν〉 〈I| pν〉 , and evoking the pdf normalization: 〈I| pν〉 =
1 , yields:∣∣∣d˜ν〉 = (kν + 1) |dν〉 = A˜ν |pν〉 ; A˜ν : ℜN → ℜM+1. (6)
The operator A˜ν is ill-conditioned and rectangular. Thus, (6) becomes:
|pν〉 =
(
A˜ν
)−1 ∣∣∣d˜ν〉+ ∣∣∣pν′〉 , (7)
where,
(
A˜ν
)−1
is the pseudo-inverse [10] of A˜ν , and lies in range
(
A˜ν
)
.
All necessary data dependent information resides in
(
A˜ν
)−1 ∣∣∣d˜ν〉.
The null space term in (7) is of particular importance since the code is encoded
into it via unitary projections. Here,
∣∣∣pν′〉 ∈ null (A˜ν) is explicitly data
independent 2 . However, it is critically dependent on the solution methodology
2 In this paper, null () signifies the null space of an ill-conditioned operator, unless
explicitly specified as being the MATLABr routine to calculate the normalized
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employed to solve (7). To define the unitary projections of the embedded code,
the operator Gν = A˜ν†A˜ν is introduced. Here, A˜ν† is the conjugate transpose
of A˜ν . For real matrices, A˜ν† = A˜νT , where A˜νT is the transpose of A˜ν .
It is legitimate to project the covert information into null
(
A˜ν
)
instead of
null (Gν) [7]. The “loss of information” caused by floating point errors could
make the evaluation of null (Gν) prohibitively unstable for many applications.
Specifically, this operation squares the condition number, resulting in the large
singular values being increased and the small singular values decreased. This
instability is used to the advantage of the designer to increase the security of
the covert information.
Assuming the availability of A˜ν and |pν〉, the normalized eigenvectors corre-
sponding to the eigenvalues in the null space of Gν having value zero (zero
eigenvalues) is: |ηνn〉 ;n = 1, ..., N − (M +1). The |ηνn〉 are hereafter referred to
as the basis of null (Gν). The unitary decryption Uˆνdec : ℜN → ℜN−(M+1)
and encryption operators Uˆνenc : ℜN−(M+1) → ℜN operators for each ν are:
Uˆνdec =
N−M−1∑
n=1
|n〉 〈ηνn|,
and,
Uˆνenc = Uˆ
ν†
dec =
N−M−1∑
n=1
|ηνn〉 〈n|,
(8)
respectively. Note that Uˆνdec • Uˆνenc = I , where I is the identity operator.
Given a code |qν〉 ∈ ℜN−(M+1) to be encrypted in a host pdf having hierarchy
index ν , the N − (M + 1) components are given by 〈n | qν〉 = qνn;n =
1, ..., N − (M + 1) . The pdf of the embedded code is:
|pνc 〉 = Uˆνenc |qν〉 =
N−M−1∑
n=1
|ηνn〉 〈n | qν〉. (9)
The total pdf comprising the host pdf and the pdf of the code is:
|p˜ν〉 = |pν〉+ |pνc 〉 . (10)
Since |pνc 〉 ∈ null
(
A˜ν
)
, A˜ν |pνc 〉 = 0 . In the decryption stage, the recon-
structed host pdf ’s: |pνr〉, are first obtained. The pdf ’s of the embedded code
is recovered from:
|pνrc〉 =
∣∣∣p˜ν〉− |pνr〉 . (11)
basis of an ill-conditioned operator (eg. Section 3.1).
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The encrypted code is recovered by the operation:
|qνr 〉 = Uˆνdec |pνrc〉 =
N−M−1∑
n=1
|n〉 〈ηνn | pνrc〉. (12)
The above theory does not, by itself, constitute the strategy to encrypt/decrypt
code. This is achieved in two manners,i.e, symmetric and asymmetric crypto-
graphic strategies [11,12]. Before proceeding further, the concept of a key in
the encryption of covert information is briefly explained. The distribution of
keys is an issue of primary concern in cryptography and allied disciplines. A
key may be a program, a number, or a string of numbers that enables the le-
gitimate recipient of the message (decrypter) to access the covert information.
In cryptography, a secret, shared, or private key is an encryption/decryption
key known only to the entities that exchange secret messages.
In traditional secret key cryptography, a key would be shared by the commu-
nicators so that each could encrypt and decrypt messages. The risk in this
system is that if either party loses the key or it is stolen, the system is broken.
Secret key cryptography is also susceptible to a number of malicious attacks,
the most common being the plaintext attack [11,12]. By definition, a plain-
text attack is one where the prior messages have intercepted and decrypted
in order to decrypt other messages. A more recent alternative is to use a
combination of public and private keys. In this system, a public key is used
together with a secret key. The RSA protocol [1] is a prominent example of
a public key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI often employs a key ring strategy.
Specifically, one key is kept secret while the others are made public. PKI is
the preferred approach on the Internet. The secret key system is sometimes
known as symmetric cryptography and the public key system as asymmetric
cryptography.
In this model, an operator G˜ν is formed by perturbing select elements of Gν
by δGνi,j. In symmetric cryptography, only a single element of G
ν is per-
turbed. The security of the code may be ensured by adopting an asymmetric
cryptographic strategy. Here, more than one element of Gν is perturbed.
Each δGνi,j > δ
ν , a threshold. The extreme sensitivity to perturbations of Gν
causes the eigenstructure of G˜ν = Gν + δGνi,j to substantially differ from that
of Gν , This assertion is valid even for infinitesimal perturbations δGνi,j. To dis-
tinguish operations involving the ill-conditioned operators G˜ν , the following
change of notation is effected in (9)-(12): |qν〉 → |q˜ν〉,|ηνn〉 → |η˜νn〉, |pνc 〉 → |p˜νc 〉,
|p˜ν〉 →
∣∣∣p˜νpert〉,|pνrc〉 → |p˜νrc〉, and, |qνr 〉 → |q˜νr 〉. The |η˜νn〉 are hereafter referred
to as the basis of null
(
G˜ν
)
.
Determination of the threshold is a vital task in defining the cryptographic
keys in this model. This is accomplished by the designer (encrypter) who per-
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forms a simultaneous encryption/decryption without effecting perturbations
to the operator Gν . Specifically, using (2), the host pdf ’s are inferred by solv-
ing an inverse MaxEnt problem. The code |qν〉 having dimension N−(M+1)
is formed. The designer implements (9)-(12) for each hierarchy index ν. The
threshold for the cryptographic key/keys is: δν = ‖|qν〉 − |qνr 〉‖.
3 Implementation of the Encryption/Decryption Strategy
The process of encryption occurs after the host pdf ’s have been inferred from
incomplete constraints for multiple pdf ’s. This procedure is detailed in Sec-
tion 4. The terminology in cryptography and allied disciplines refers to two
communicating parties as Alice and Bob, and, an eavesdropper as Eve. In this
study, the author performs the role of both Alice and Bob by implementing
the encryption on an IBM RS-6000 workstation cluster and, the decryption
on an IBM Thinkpad running MATLABr v 7.01.
Herein, the implementation of the encryption/decryption strategy by effecting
perturbations δGνi,j to the operator G
ν is described. The procedures are to
be implemented for each hierarchy index ν. This Section presents the imple-
mentation of the encryption/decryption strategies in point form, for the sake
of clarity and brevity.
3.1 Encryption
(i.) The host pdf |pν〉 is inferred from incomplete constraints by solving (2)
as an inverse MaxEnt problem. (ii.) The constraint operators A˜ν and Gν are
evaluated formed, for an a-priori specified value of the parameter kν , from
(5). The operator G˜ν is formed by perturbing one or more elements of Gν by
δGνi,j > δ
ν , the cryptographic key/keys. (iii.) The basis |η˜νn〉 ;n = 1, ..., N −
(M + 1) , are evaluated by operating on G˜ν with the MATLABr routine
null (•) that employs SVD, or with an equivalent routine. (iv.) The code |q˜ν〉
is generated, and, is encoded into the null space of G˜ν using (9). (v.) The total
pdf
∣∣∣p˜νpert〉 is obtained using (10).
3.2 Transmission
The statistical encryption model provides two separate manners in which in-
formation may be transferred from the encrypter to the decrypter, via a public
7
channel. The first mode is to transmit the constraint operators A˜ν and the to-
tal pdf ’s
∣∣∣p˜νpert〉. An alternate mode is to transmit the LM’s obtained on solving
the inverse MaxEnt problem(Section 3.1), and, the total pdf ’s
∣∣∣p˜νpert〉. Owing
to the large dimensions of the constraint operators A˜ν , the latter transmission
strategy is more attractive. The values of parameters kν for each hierarchy in-
dex, and, the cryptography key/keys are transmitted through a secure/covert
channel. The key/keys are labeled in order to identify the elements of the op-
erator Gν that are perturbed. In the case of asymmetric cryptography, some
of the keys may be declared public, while keeping the remainder private.
3.3 Decryption
(vi.) The legitimate receiver recovers the key/keys δGνi,j and the parameter
kν from the covert channel. (vii.) The operators A˜ν , Gν , and, G˜ν are
constructed. (viii.) The host pdf may be recovered in two distinct manners,
depending upon the transmission strategy employed. Note that both methods
to reconstruct the host pdf require the total pdf p˜νpert to be provided by the
encrypter. First, the scaled incomplete constraints, defined in (6), are obtained
by solving 〈i| A˜ν
∣∣∣p˜νpert〉 = ∣∣∣d˜ν〉 . Here, i is a basis vector in ℜM+1 . This
procedure is possible because |p˜νc 〉 ∈ null
(
A˜ν
)
. Thus, A˜ν |p˜νc 〉 = 0 . The host
pdf are then computed for each hierarchy index by solving the inverse MaxEnt
problem, using the re-scaled set of incomplete constraints. Alternatively, the
host pdf may be obtained by solving (2) as a forward MaxEnt problem, given
the values of the LM’s λνi ; i = 1, ...,M obtained from the inverse MaxEnt
problem (Section 3.1). Both methods allow the reconstructed host pdf ’s |pνr〉
to be obtained with a high degree of precision. (ix.) The reconstructed code
pdf |p˜νrc〉 is recovered using (11). (x.) The reconstructed code |q˜νr 〉 is obtained
using (12).
It is important to note that the success of the encryption/decryption strategy
is critically dependent upon the exact compatibility of software available to
the encrypter and decrypter. Of special importance is the compatibility of the
routines to calculate the basis |η˜νn〉.
4 Numerical Simulations
This Section provides numerical simulations to analyze the theory and im-
plementation of the statistical encryption/decryption strategy, presented in
Section’s 2. and 3., respectively. To demonstrate the efficacy of the theory pre-
sented in this paper, it is judicious to compare the pdf dependent model with
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a pdf independent model [8]. These are characterized by the constraint oper-
ators A˜ν (described in (5) and (6)), and, A (described in (4)), respectively.
The following numerical studies perform the encryption/decryption strategy
for the case of asymmetric cryptography. Section 4.1 demonstrates the infer-
ence of the host pdf ’s from incomplete constraints, using an inverse MaxEnt
procedure.
The comparative analysis between the pdf dependent model and the pdf in-
dependent model is accomplished using two separate metrics, that define the
security of the covert information. Host pdf ’s that deviate further from the
equilibrium state often possess a constraint operator A˜ν having a higher con-
dition number, as compared with pdf ’s that are closer to the equilibrium state.
Increasing the condition number of the constraint operator A˜ν (or, A) repre-
sents one way of securing the integrity of the covert information. The condi-
tion numbers of the constraint operators are obtained using the MATLABr
routine cond (•). This provides a measure of the sensitivity of null (G) and
null (Gν) to perturbations.
In the pdf dependent model, the security of the code is enhanced by the
increased sensitivity of null (Gν) to perturbations of select elements of the op-
erator Gν , resulting in the operator G˜ν with null space denoted by null
(
G˜ν
)
.
Within the framework of this model, a more relevant metric of the extreme
sensitivity of null (Gν) to perturbations, brought about by the introduction of
the cryptographic keys δGνi,j, is the distortion of the code pdf |pνc 〉. Here, |pνc 〉
is evaluated from (9), using ηνn (the basis of null (G
ν)). The distorted code pdf
is |p˜νc 〉, which is calculated from (9) using η˜νn (the basis of null
(
G˜ν
)
). Note
that the codes |q˜ν〉 and |qν〉 are identical kets.
For the pdf dependent model, the RMS error of encryption between |p˜νc 〉 and
|pνc 〉 is defined as: RMSνenc = ‖err
ν
enc‖√
length(errνenc)
. Here, ‖errνenc‖ = ‖(|p˜νc 〉 − |pνc 〉)‖ ,
and, length (errνenc) is the dimension of (|p˜νc 〉 − |pνc 〉). Section 4.3 will exemplify
the utility of RMSνenc in resolving a dichotomy. Specifically, it will be demon-
strated that a high value of RMSνenc is the reason for host pdf ’s possessing
constraint operators with lower condition numbers, sometimes providing a
greater degree of security to the encoded covert information, than host pdf ’s
possessing constraint operators with higher condition numbers.
Another measure of the security of the covert information, that is opera-
tionally advantageous, is the RMS error of the difference between the en-
crypted code, and, the code reconstructed without the cryptographic keys. For
the pdf dependent model, the RMS error of reconstruction is: RMSνrecon =
‖errνrecon‖√
length(errνrecon)
. Here, ‖errνrecon‖ = ‖(|q˜ν〉 − |q˜νr1〉)‖ , and, length (errνrecon) is
the dimension of (|q˜ν〉 − |q˜νr1〉).
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The rationale for evaluating the RMSνrecon is to obtain a measure of the error
of reconstruction by an unauthorized eavesdropper (Eve), who does not possess
the correct cryptographic keys δGνi,j. Eve is, however, assumed to be in pos-
session of the reconstructed code pdf |p˜νrc〉. Such an attack may be simulated
by choosing the wrong set of keys, and, incorrectly constructing the perturbed
operators G˜ν and G˜ . Alternatively, an analogous scenario may be simulated
by assuming that the reconstruction is performed without keys (sans keys). In
this case, the reconstructed code without keys is: |q˜νr1〉 =
N−M−1∑
n=1
|n〉 〈ηνn | p˜νrc〉.
Here, ηνn is the basis of null (G
ν). Section 4.2 presents the comparative anal-
ysis using the performance metrics described above. Analysis of the results is
provided in Section 4.3.
4.1 Inference of the host pdf’s
Host pdf column vectors (kets) corresponding to hierarchy indices ν = 1 and
ν = 2, each of dimension 401, are independently inferred in the event space
[−1, 1] . The incomplete constraints are the first four moments of the random
variable xn;n = 1, ..., N . From (2), one obtains:
dνi =
N=401∑
n=1
xine
−λν
1
xn−λν2x
2
n−λ
ν
3
x3n−λ
ν
4
x4n
N=401∑
n=1
e−λ
ν
1
xn−λν2x
2
n
−λν
3
x3
n
−λν
4
x4
n
; i = 1, ...,M = 4 (13)
Here, (13) is solved as an inverse MaxEnt problem for two different sets of
incomplete constraints (corresponding to each hierarchy index ), provided as
input values. These are dν=11 = −0.0224,dν=12 = 0.1048,dν=13 = −0.0124,dν=14 =
0.0284, and, dν=21 = 0.1,d
ν=2
2 = 0.3,d
ν=2
3 = 0.1,d
ν=2
4 = 0.15, respectively. Note
that the values of dν=1i , are taken to be the same as those in [8].
Each hierarchy index yields M +1 constraint equations, that are solved using
a Newton-Raphson procedure. Note that the (M + 1)st constraint equation
follows from the pdf normalization condition. The values of the LM’s are found
to be λν=11 = −0.30435,λν=12 = 2.99664,λν=13 = 4.85637,dν=14 = 3.81359 ,
and, λν=21 = 1.74906,λ
ν=2
2 = −5.09475,λν=23 = −4.8568,λν=24 = 8.48337 ,
respectively.
In this example, each constraint operator A˜ν is of dimension 5× 401 , and,
the number of basis η˜ν=1,2n is 396, for each hierarchy index. Figure 1 depicts
the two host pdf ’s. The case with hierarchy index ν = 1 is the single peaked
pdf, while the case with hierarchy index ν = 2 is the double peaked pdf.
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Fig. 1. Host pdf ’s inferred from incomplete constraints for ν = 1 and ν = 2
4.2 Comparative analysis
The MATLABr random number generator rand (•) is evoked to generate
code in [0, 1] . In order to establish a degree of uniformity in the comparisons,
two identical kets of the code, each having dimension N− (M+1) i.e. 396, are
created for projection into the null spaces of the perturbed operators G˜ν and
G˜, respectively. This ”emulates” the selective projection of a code comprising
of a single ket of dimension 792, into null
(
G˜ν=1,2
)
and null
(
G˜
)
, for each
hierarchy index.
A further measure of uniformity in the comparative analysis is sought by
specifying the perturbations to both G and Gν as δG1,3 = δG˜
ν=1,2
1,3 =
3.0e − 013 (first row, third column) and δG2,7 = δG˜ν=1,22,7 = 7.0e − 013
(second row, seventh column), respectively. All numerical examples in this
paper have a threshold for perturbations δν ∼ 4.4e− 014 .
Simulations for the case of the pdf independent model are described in Section
4.2.1. Two distinct case studies for the pdf dependent model are described in
Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively. The results are presented in Table 1
through Table 3. Therein, sample values of the original code, the code re-
constructed with the keys, and, the code reconstructed without the keys are
presented. These comprise the 1st, 75th, 177th, 296th, and, 395th elements of
the respective arrays (kets). As is evident from the numerical simulations, the
reconstructed code with the keys is exactly similar to the original code. The
corresponding RMSνrecon is zero. On the other hand, the code reconstructed
without the keys bears no resemblance to the original code.
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Table 1
Select code values for the pdf independent model. |qν〉 - the original code,|qνr 〉 - the
code reconstructed with the keys, and, |qνr1〉 - the code reconstructed without the
keys. ∣∣qν=1,2〉 ∣∣∣qν=1,2r 〉 ∣∣∣qν=1,2r1 〉
0.23813682639005 0.23813682639005 -0.09239755885631
0.69913526160795 0.69913526160795 0.20008072567388
0.27379424177629 0.27379424177629 -0.16469110441464
0.17686701421432 0.17686701421432 0.92507582836680
0.20288628732009 0.20288628732009 -0.51825561367528
Table 2
Select code values for the pdf dependent model-case study 1. |q˜ν〉 - the original
code,|q˜νr 〉 - the code reconstructed with the keys, and, |q˜νr1〉 - the code reconstructed
without the keys.∣∣q˜ν=1,2〉 ∣∣∣q˜ν=1,2r 〉 ∣∣q˜ν=1r1 〉 ∣∣q˜ν=2r1 〉
0.23813682639005 0.23813682639005 -0.08237185729405 0.40428740297403
0.69913526160795 0.69913526160795 -0.01133471359936 0.30190786147110
0.27379424177629 0.27379424177629 -0.33080751552396 -0.29261640748833
0.17686701421432 0.17686701421432 -1.18947579992697 0.53834101226185
0.20288628732009 0.20288628732009 0.54528163427934 -0.10688384159491
4.2.1 Pdf independent model
Here, cond (A) = 18.80458 , RMSν=1,2enc = 0.76998, and, RMS
ν=1,2
recon = 0.77483 .
The values of the encrypted and reconstructed codes are independent of the
hierarchy index. These results are consistent with expectations since the nature
of the host pdf is not reflected in the constraint operator A. Select code values
are presented in Table 1.
4.2.2 Pdf dependent model : case study 1
The parameters are kν=1 = 0.065, and, kν=2 = 0.09. Here, cond
(
A˜ν=1
)
=
19.87136,RMSν=1enc = 0.79533, and,RMS
ν=1
recon = 0.80034. Further, cond
(
A˜ν=2
)
= 20.42975, RMSν=2enc = 0.82570, and, RMS
ν=2
recon = 0.83090. This case repre-
sents a noticeable increase in the level of security of the code, and flexibility of
the theory, as compared with the pdf independent model. Select code values
are presented in Table 2.
12
Table 3
Select code values for the pdf dependent model-case study 2. |q˜ν〉 - the original
code,|q˜νr 〉 - the code reconstructed with the keys, and, |q˜νr1〉 - the code reconstructed
without the keys.∣∣q˜ν=1,2〉 ∣∣∣q˜ν=1,2r 〉 ∣∣q˜ν=1r1 〉 ∣∣q˜ν=2r1 〉
0.23813682639005 0.23813682639005 0.41205157405440 -1.47600706971518
0.69913526160795 0.69913526160795 0.96359310993344 -0.12406066610739
0.27379424177629 0.27379424177629 -0.03625400789579 0.71289692833557
0.17686701421432 0.17686701421432 -0.94767053576282 -0.37638356088402
0.20288628732009 0.20288628732009 -0.87540038881240 0.57110616844674
4.2.3 Pdf dependent model :case study 2 - a study in contrast
The parameters are kν=1 = −0.03, and, kν=2 = −0.5. Here, cond
(
A˜ν=1
)
=
18.31597,RMSν=1enc = 0.81620 and,RMS
ν=1
recon = 0.82134. Further, cond
(
A˜ν=2
)
= 11.97782, RMSν=2enc = 0.84434 , and, RMS
ν=2
recon = 0.84965. This case rep-
resents a noticeable increase in the level of security of the code in terms of
RMSν=1,2recon , the RMS error of reconstruction, as compared with the results in
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. Select code values are presented in Table
3.
4.3 Analysis of results
The case presented in Section 4.2.2 follows expectations. Specifically, the con-
straint operators A˜ν=1,2 possess larger condition numbers than the constraint
operator A of the pdf independent model, presented in Section 4.2.1. Further,
the RMSν=1,2enc and RMS
ν=1,2
recon in the pdf dependent model are greater those
for the pdf independent model. This implies that the pdf dependent model
provides greater security to the covert information, than the pdf independent
model. The case presented in Section 4.2.3 represents an interesting scenario,
which poses a dichotomy of sorts.
Conventional logic would expect an increase in the condition numbers of
A˜ν=1,2 to coincide with an increase in the sensitivity of null (Gν=1,2), and
thus, an increase in the values of RMSν=1,2recon . Section 4.2.3 conclusively demon-
strates the fact that the condition number of A˜ν and the RMSνrecon do not
necessarily increase simultaneously. Specifically, the case presented in Section
4.2.3 demonstrates a significant decrease in the condition numbers of A˜ν=1,2 ,
that is accompanied by a significant increase in RMSν=1,2recon .
This dichotomy may be explained by the fact that an increase in the value
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of RMSν=1,2recon is always accompanied by a corresponding increase in the RMS
error of encryption: RMSν=1,2enc . This trend is evident in each of the case stud-
ies presented in this paper, and, has been consistently observed in numerous
simulation exercises. As indicated in the introduction of Section 4, the RMS
error of encryption (RMSνenc) represents a more relevant metric to assess the
sensitivity of null (Gν) to perturbations δGνi,j, as compared to the condition
number of Aν , within the framework of this statistical encryption/decryption
model.
This Section is concluded by providing a glimpse of the effects of the instability
of the eigenstructures of the ill-conditioned operators. Figure 2 depicts the
error of encryption: |p˜νc 〉 - |pν〉 for the case study presented in Section 4.2.3,
corresponding to kν=2 = −0.5 T˙he highly oscillatory (”chaotic”) profile in
Figure 2 is indicative of the extreme sensitivity of null (Gν) to perturbations
δGνi,j applied to G
ν .
It may be noted that the code |q˜ν〉, projected into each host pdf, comprises
of a ket of dimension 396 created by a random number generator. While one
might expect the randomness inherent in |q˜ν〉 to be factored into the error
of encryption, further investigation concerning the oscillatory behavior is re-
quired. The ket |q˜ν〉 is subjected to a sorting operation, by employing the
MATLABr routine sort (•). This results in a ket |q˜ν〉 of dimension 396,
containing progressively increasing values defined in [0, 1]. The resulting error
of encryption using the sorted code is depicted in Figure 3.
As is observed, the error of encryption still displays a highly pronounced os-
cillatory behavior, despite the randomness in the code being mitigated. Akin
to the case depicted in Figure 2, this oscillatory behavior is reflective of the
instability induced in null (Gν) by perturbing 2 elements of Gν (having di-
mension 401×401) by 3.0e−013 and 7.0e−013, respectively. Figure 4 depicts
the total pdf defined by (10), corresponding to the case study presented in
Section 4.2.3 for ν = 2. As is expected, the total pdf exhibits a highly oscil-
latory (”chaotic”) behavior. This is in stark contrast to the smooth curves of
the host pdf ’s depicted in Figure 1.
5 Summary and Conclusions
A novel strategy to project covert information into a hierarchy of statistical
hosts has been presented. This has been accomplished within the ambit of the
MaxEnt principle. The encryption/decryption strategy relates the projection
of the covert information to the host pdf ’s. This feature permits the statistical
encryption/decryption strategy to possess immense qualitative flexibility, and,
provide enhanced security to the covert information, as compared to a pdf
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Fig. 2. Plot of the error of encryption: |p˜νc 〉- |pνc 〉.
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Fig. 3. Plot of the error of encryption: |p˜νc 〉- |pνc 〉 with sorted code.
independent model [8].
The pdf dependent model, presented herein, sometimes demonstrates an in-
creased RMS error of reconstruction for decreased values of the condition
number of the constraint operator Aν . This seemingly counter-intuitive result
is adequately explained with the aid of the RMS error of encryption. The
RMS error of encryption is demonstrated to be a viable and relevant metric
to assess the sensitivity of null (Gν) to perturbations δGνi,j.
The statistical encryption/decryption strategy is platform independent, and
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Fig. 4. ”Chaotic” nature of the total pdf = host pdf + code pdf
the process of recovery of the covert information is accomplished with a very
high degree of precision. The small amounts of data being transmitted through
the covert channel as a consequence of the transmission of the cryptographic
keys δGνi,j and the hierarchy indices k
ν ’s (see Section 3.2), augers well for a
coupling between the statistical encryption/decryption model, and a quantum
key distribution protocol [13, 14].
A study extending the present work, by describing the statistical encryp-
tion/decryption strategy within the framework of a Fisher-Schro¨dinger model,
has been recently completed. Herein, the Fisher information has been em-
ployed as the measure of uncertainty. The host pdf ’s satisfy a time indepen-
dent Schro¨dinger-like equation (TISLE) with an empirical pseudo-potential,
that approximates a time independent Schro¨dinger equation (TISE) physical
potential [7, 15] . The TISLE inherits the energy states of the TISE, within
an information theoretic context. The encryption of covert information is tan-
tamount to projection of the code into different energy states of the TISLE.
The hierarchy indices in the present paper are replaced by the TISLE energy
states.
The Fisher-Schro¨dinger model provides a quantum mechanical connotation to
the statistical encryption/decryption strategy. Coupling the Fisher-Schro¨dinger
model with a quantum key distribution protocol holds forth the prospect of
achieving a self-consistent hybrid statistical/quantum mechanical cryptosys-
tem. This work will be shortly presented for publication.
Ongoing work is directed towards a two-pronged objective. First, the pro-
jection of the covert information into null (Gν) has been provided with an
information theoretic basis. Next, models to extend the work presented in
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this paper to the case of steganography and information hiding have been
developed.
By definition, steganography involves hiding data inside other (host) data.
In steganography, the covert information is concealed in a manner such that
no one apart from the intended recipient knows of the existence of the mes-
sage. This is in contrast to cryptography, where the existence of the message
is obvious, but the meaning is obscured. The extension of the statistical en-
cryption/decryption model presented in this paper to steganography involves
encrypting image data into a cover image. In this case, the average pixel inten-
sities of the cover image constitute the incomplete constraints. These results
will be presented in future publications.
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